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Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality 
of Democracy on the African 
Continent? An Analysis of Institutional 
Capacity and Public Perceptions1 
Abstract 
While modern parliaments in Africa receive little attention in the scholarly 
literature, they are receiving considerable attention from the international 
donor community. Since the early 1990s, when many African countries resumed 
multi-party elections and democratic practices, legislative strengthening 
programmes have become an important part of international democracy 
assistance. Despite these programmes, our knowledge about Africa’s current 
parliaments remains limited. They seem to be widely regarded as potential 
agents for democratic change but whether national legislatures are in fact 
enhancing the quality of democracy on the African continent is far from clear. 
This paper discusses two important issues that lie at the heart of the democracy 
enhancing potential of Africa’s current parliaments: their institutional capacity 
and the way they are perceived by the citizens they represent. After a brief 
review of the existing literature on legislatures in Africa, the paper first 
considers whether parliaments have the institutional capacity to fulfill a 
meaningful role and then provides a detailed description of the autonomy of 
parliaments in 16 selected countries. The paper subsequently turns to the way 
Africans perceive and evaluate their parliaments. Do citizens see their 
legislatures as valuable institutions? Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
findings for the prospects of African parliaments becoming agents of democratic 
change. 
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What do we know about legislatures in Africa? 
Africa’s legislatures are largely absent from the comparative body of literature 
about parliaments and their members. And although some parliaments in Africa 
have been described as ‘emerging institutions of horizontal accountability’, the 
growing literature on democratisation pays little attention to the representative 
bodies of Africa’s current political regimes.2 Most of the existing studies date 
from three or four decades ago and paint a bleak picture of powerless 
parliaments in Africa’s newly independent states. More recent contributions to 
the literature have only just begun to identify important variations in the strength 
of Africa’s current legislatures.  
The scholarly literature on parliaments in Africa mostly dates back to the early 
years of independence and has its substantive focus on assessing the strength of 
the then newly established parliaments. This first generation of studies, 
comprising mostly case studies and contributions comparing a small number of 
cases,3 examined the impact of several key variables, such as colonial legacies, 
                                                 
2  Although the number of studies of legislatures in emerging democracies is growing, the 
literature is still dominated by analyses of parliaments and parliamentarians in the established 
democracies of Western Europe and the U.S. Gamm and Huber (2004) report that 85 percent 
of the articles published about legislatures in the American Political Science Review, the 
American Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Politics between 1993 and 2001 
dealt with the American experience. The American specialised journal Legislative Studies 
Quarterly (LSQ) shows a similar focus on American legislative politics. Less than 25 percent 
of the articles in Legislative Studies Quarterly between 1995 and 2002 dealt with the 
legislative experience outside the US. The British Journal of Legislative Studies (JLS), on the 
other hand, devotes most of its space to parliaments outside the U.S. However, African 
legislatures are absent from both the LSQ and the JLS. The LSQ has published no articles 
about African legislatures, while the JLS has only published one article on an African 
legislature by P. Burnell in 2002. Since the early 1990s, when a wave of liberalisation and 
democratisation started to change the political landscape on the African continent, many 
African countries resumed multi-party elections and democratic practices but even the 
growing body of literature on the so called ‘third wave of democratisation’ has paid little 
attention to legislatures. World Politics, one of the important journals in comparative politics, 
has published no articles on legislatures since 1992. Nor has the Journal of Democracy 
published any articles (since mid-1993) in which the legislature or the legislative process is 
the primary focus of discussion. See Gamm and Huber (2004).  
3  Loewenberg and Patterson (1979: 337) included the case of Kenya in their seminal work 
Comparing Legislatures. Their discussion of the Kenyan case was mostly based on the data 
gathered by Barkan, whose work is discussed elsewhere in this paper. Le Vine (1979) 
presents a comparative analysis of the development of parliaments in 14 francophone African 
countries in the period from independence until 1975 and concludes that parliaments in the 
former French colonies do not play an important role in policy-making. Instead, their main 
contribution has been in the area of nation building. Stultz (1968), looking at 12 ‘Parliaments 
in Former British Black Africa’ also points to a limited decision making role and identifies a 
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the appointment and dismissal powers of governing parties, executive control of 
state resources and role perceptions of legislators. They uniformly concluded 
that these factors contributed to the institutional weakness of the new 
legislatures vis-à-vis strong executives as well as to their limited role in policy- 
and law-making.4 Other early studies that examined African legislatures in a 
broader cross-national comparative framework also emphasised their 
institutional and policy-making weaknesses, but stressed their roles in 
legitimising government policies, recruiting and socialising new elites, and 
mobilising public support for political regimes (Mezey 1970). 
With the post-independence emergence of authoritarian regimes throughout the 
African continent, scholarly interest in African legislatures ebbed away. There 
are, however, a few studies of national legislatures in the context of a single 
party state (see for example Kjekshus 1974). Barkan showed that, even within 
the constraints of a single-party regime, the Kenyan legislature played an 
important role in the development of a largely agrarian society by linking widely 
dispersed local constituencies to the state. Barkan’s study is an important 
contribution to the literature because of its relevance to other African countries 
many of which still are predominantly, if not exclusively, agrarian societies 
(Barkan 1979).  
More recently, the resurgence of democracy on the continent has renewed 
scholarly interest in Africa’s parliaments. Like the first generation of studies 
conducted soon after independence, the recent studies typically focus on single 
countries and routinely point to the institutional weakness and limited decision-
making role of legislatures in Africa (Thomas and Sissokho 2005; Burnell 2002; 
Burnell 2003). In an innovative departure from previous approaches, Mattes and 
Chiwandamira surveyed not only members of and organisations working closely 
with the Zambian parliament but also members of the Zambian public. They 
found a ‘yawning chasm’ between citizens’ views of MPs and how MPs see 
themselves. The public opinion survey highlighted a widespread popular 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of structural and performance characteristics which parliaments in the former British 
colonies seem to share.  
4  Hakes and Helgerson (1973) looking at the first parliaments of Zambia and Kenya, explain 
how the executive’s control of state resources and powers to appoint and dismiss members are 
used as currency in a bargaining process, thus compromising the role of individual MPs. 
Stultz (1970) in his case study of the first Kenyan parliament, also emphasises the importance 
of executive-legislative relations and the partisan context in which parliament operates, as 
well as its function of legitimisation. Stultz concludes that the decisional function of the 
Kenyan parliament is relatively unimportant and that MPs are lacking a sense of meaningful 
participation in decision making. Hopkins’ (1970) study of Tanzanian MPs similarly reveals 
that in Tanzania’s first parliament the party exerts an influence which renders MPs 
ineffective: ‘the role of the MP in the actual legislature is quite minor’. According to Hopkins, 
Tanzanian MPs are generally supportive of cabinet ministers because anything to the contrary 
compromises one’s chances of being appointed to positions of influence.  
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perception of the Zambian parliament as an unresponsive and opaque institution, 
while MPs reported that they spend most of their time listening to people’s 
problems and dealing with constituency matters (Mattes and Chiwandamira 
2004: ii).     
In another path-breaking study, Barkan, Ademolekun and Zhou (2004: 252) 
recently conducted the first systematic comparison of strengths and weaknesses 
of four African legislatures. Based on interviews with MPs and people working 
in or closely with parliament, they conclude that although legislatures in Africa 
are often labeled as weak, there are important cross-national variations. The 
study found that ‘the authority of the legislature ranged from being very weak in 
Senegal, to moderately strong in Kenya with Benin and Ghana falling 
somewhere in between’ and hypothesises about three sets of variables that might 
explain this variation: contextual variables relating to the structure of society, 
variables relating to constitutional provisions and formal rules and variables 
relating to the internal structure of the legislature and the resources available to 
members.5   
Finally, there is a small but growing literature on the South African parliament 
pointing to the limited success of the National Assembly in terms of oversight 
and the problems it is encountering in terms of representation and building links 
with the people (Nijzink 2001; Murray and Nijzink 2003; Harvey 2002; Nijzink 
and Piombo 2005; Habib and Herzenberg 2005; Barkan 2005). This literature 
also points to the fact that the South African parliament might, in a number of 
ways, be different from other African legislatures.  
Overall, the existing studies of African legislatures present us with, at best, 
sketchy evidence on the relative strength or importance of Africa’s parliaments 
in terms of law- and policy-making, oversight and representation or any other 
functions they might perform. Although these studies offer insights into the 
structure and operation of certain parliaments, most fail to take a cross-national 
comparative approach and find that African legislatures are weak and ineffective 
without offering criteria for conceptualising and measuring legislative strength 
and effectiveness. In other words, the virtually uniform finding that African 
legislatures are weak is premised on the notion of a strong legislature, yet, the 
literature offers little criteria for either conceptualising or measuring legislative 
strength in a way that enables cross-national comparison.  
This problem is not only evident in the first generation of studies conducted 
immediately after independence, but also plagues some of the more recent 
studies. The study by Mattes and Chiwandamira (2004), however, while focused 
                                                 
5 Another recently published comparative study describes the level of representation of 
women in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 1999, see Yoon (2001). 
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on Zambia, offers a research design that can be fruitfully applied in a 
comparative study of other African legislatures. It points us to the importance of 
public opinion; an issue we will discuss later in this paper. The four-country 
study by Barkan  et al. (2004) also offers a useful framework for further cross-
national comparison. It suggests a number of variables, mostly related to 
institutional capacity, that seem to influence the potential of parliaments to 
enhance the quality of democracy on the African continent.  
The institutional capacity of African 
parliaments 
At first glance, legislatures in Africa’s current regimes seem to have limited 
institutional capacity to represent citizens, make laws and ensure accountability 
among presidents. Capacity-building is an important focus of democracy 
assistance programmes run by international organisations like the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank and European Union 
(EU) and country based agencies like the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Since the early 
1990s when a wave of liberalisation and democratisation started to change the 
political landscape on the African continent and many countries resumed multi-
party elections and democratic practices, international donors have responded by 
financially supporting efforts to build the institutional capacity of parliaments 
across the continent. Legislative strengthening programmes have been 
established in a number of Africa’s current political regimes, but international 
support seems to be unevenly distributed. Some parliaments like those in 
Malawi and South Africa immediately after 1994 are or were ‘donor darlings’, 
while others, like the parliaments of Cameroon or Swaziland, receive little or no 
support to strengthen their institutional capacity. The success of parliamentary 
support programmes seems to be equally uneven and more importantly rather 
uncertain.6  
To what extent do international donors succeed in strengthening the capacity of 
parliaments in Africa? Do legislative strengthening programmes actually lead to 
increased parliamentary performance and enhanced quality of democracy? 
Questions about the effectiveness of capacity building in African parliaments 
remain largely unanswered because we do not yet have comprehensive and 
comparative measures of the institutional capacity and performance of 
parliaments on the continent. Without such measures, we are unable to assess 
                                                 
6 For a review of the progress of the South African parliament in the context of the EU 
Parliamentary Support Programme in South Africa, see Murray and Nijzink (2003). 
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and evaluate the impact of international support programmes on the extent to 
which Africa’s current parliaments are able to make laws, represent citizens and 
oversee the executive and play a key role in enhancing the quality of democracy 
on the continent. 
What we do know is that not all African parliaments are equally weak; some 
have greater resources, powers and autonomy than others. The African 
Legislatures Project has embarked on comparative research that seeks to identify 
the most important differences in institutional capacity and parliamentary 
performance across Africa in order to explain why some parliaments do better or 
worse in fulfilling their main responsibilities.7 In this paper we will present 
some of our first findings related to the institutional capacity of Africa’s national 
legislatures. For the purpose of this paper, we define institutional capacity as the 
instruments that give parliaments the potential to exert influence and perform 
their main responsibilities of law-making, oversight and representation. In this 
conceptualisation, institutional capacity has two dimensions: first, the relative 
powers and level of autonomy of the legislature and second, the infrastructural, 
financial and human resources available to the institution.  
The resources of African legislatures 
We know that institutional capacity in terms of resources is generally low 
amongst African legislatures, especially compared to Western standards of very 
well resourced legislatures like the American Congress or the German 
Bundestag. This is not surprising given the differences in the level of state 
resources available for this purpose. We also know that there are important 
differences within Africa. We find legislatures like the National Assembly in 
Malawi which, despite the support of several international donors, is currently 
housed in temporary office space and is lacking adequate research support. It 
employs only two researchers and two designated committee clerks serving 13 
parliamentary committees (Smiddy 2006). On the other side of the spectrum, we 
find the relatively well resourced South African parliament which, in 2003, had 
a budget of € 41 million (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 2002). It is 
housed in extensive office buildings in Cape Town and has a well staffed 
research section with 26 researchers (Rustin  2005). The Nigerian National 
Assembly received $ 2 million from the African Capacity Building Fund to 
support a Policy Analysis and Research Project, that was officially launched in 
2005 to provide research support to Nigerian MPs.  
 
                                                 
7 For more information about the African Legislatures Project, see 
http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/daru_alp.html  
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Table 1: Number of Members (Lower House) in 16 African countries 
Country Number of members (special seats) 
Botswana 63   (6) 
Cape Verde 72 




Zimbabwe 150 (30) 
Mali 160 (13) 
Malawi 193 
Kenya 224 (14) 
Ghana  230 
Mozambique 250 
Tanzania 295 (64)* 
Uganda 305 (91) 
Nigeria 360 
South Africa 400 
Note: These numbers include special seats; where applicable the number of special seats is added in brackets. 
*231 members elected from the same number of constituencies; 48 women elected by political parties in terms of 
Article 78 of the constitution; 5 members elected by the Zanzibar House of representatives; the Attorney-
General; 10 members appointed by the president (Parliament of Tanzania website, August 2005). 
Source: www.africanelections.tripod.com, constitutions.  
Another indication of the differences in capacity that exists amongst African 
legislatures is simply the difference in size. Although it only includes the 16 
countries of our subsequent analysis, table 1 shows the variation that exists on 
the African continent. The size of the Lower House of parliament ranges from 
only 63 members in Botswana to 400 members in South Africa. The size of 
parliaments influences their capacity in two ways. First, members are one of the 
most important human resources of a legislature. They offer their individual 
skills, contacts and time to fulfil the collective responsibilities of the institution. 
When it comes to the day-to-day activities that typically occur in a House of 
Parliament, more members simply means more hands to get the various jobs 
done, albeit assessing proposed legislation, drafting amendments, scrutinising 
budgets, reading departmental reports, introducing motions, asking questions, 
attending committee and plenary meetings, participating in debates or voting.  
But size also influences capacity by affecting the need for human, infrastructural 
and financial resources. The more members a parliament has the more staff and 
office space are needed to provide an adequately supported work environment. 
More members also mean that more financial resources are needed to cover their 
salaries and other expenses.  
The size of parliament is closely related to the size of the population it 
represents. Taking this into account, we again find that African MPs are 
generally less fortunate than their Western counterparts. Calculated on the basis 
of our 16 selected countries, there are on average 110,000 African citizens to 
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one MP, while the average ratio in Western Europe is about 89,000 citizens per 
MP. And, we, again, find a fair amount of variation within Africa. Countries like 
Cape Verde and Lesotho have a very low ratio of citizens and MPs, 6000 and 15 
000 respectively, while South Africa counts about 110 000 citizens per MP and 
Nigeria 320 000.8 Clearly, this has important consequences for the way MPs 
relate to the citizens they represent, especially when one takes the geographical 
size of the country and the conditions of travel, that is, the number of paved 
roads, into account. We will discuss the relation between parliament and the 
public in more detail in the final section of this paper. Here, we just want to 
highlight differences in capacity.      
Precisely because of these differences, and the fact that capacity building in 
Africa’s current parliaments seems to have become an important subfield in 
democracy assistance, the African Legislatures Project is developing more 
detailed and comparative measures of the resources that are available to 
parliaments. With the aim of identifying best practices in Africa, we will report 
on this in future work. In the context of this paper, we will report our first 
findings on the second dimension of institutional capacity: the relative powers 
and autonomy of African legislatures.  
The level of autonomy of African legislatures 
As became clear from our review of the existing literature, powerful presidents 
seem to be one of the most important reasons why modern parliaments in Africa 
are generally regarded as weak institutions. Thus, the constitutional design of 
executive-legislative relations is an important part of the institutional capacity of 
Africa’s parliaments. What are the relative powers of the legislative and 
executive branches of government? To what extent are legislatures autonomous 
from the executive? Especially in the African context where neo-patrimonialism 
and ‘big man’ rule are more than just minor legacies from a distant past, some 
degree of autonomy is crucial if parliaments are to exert any influence on law-
making or hold strong executives accountable.  
Autonomy means something different in parliamentary than in presidential 
regimes. Where president and parliament have their own electoral mandates, that 
is, are separately elected, and the executive does not depend on the continued 
support of the legislature to stay in power autonomy takes a different form than 
                                                 
8 Western European figure calculated from Table 1.1 ’Ratios of Population per Legislator: 
Member States EU 1996’ in Norton (2002: 15). African figures calculated from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) Online, Worldbank at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ and World Population Prospects: The 2002 
Revision, April 2004. 
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in systems in which the executive is selected by the legislature and stays in 
power only as long as it has the continued confidence of the legislature. So 
before we take a detailed look at the relative powers of parliaments and 
presidents in our selected countries, we need to consider the issue of regime 
types in Africa.  
From parliamentary to presidential regimes 
Africa’s colonial history has clearly left its mark on the type of regimes that 
were initially adopted on the continent. When African colonies gained 
independence, colonial powers not only had a direct say in the constitutions that 
were adopted, they also served as models of constitutional design. As a result, 
all former British colonies adopted parliamentary systems at independence, with 
Zambia being the only exception. In other words, Zambia is the only former 
British colony which adopted a presidential design when it gained independence 
in 1964. The colonial experience seems to have had an equally strong influence 
on the regime choice in former French and Portuguese colonies. All but three 
adopted presidential systems at independence. Chad is in fact the only former 
French colony that adopted a parliamentary system. Senegal and Cape Verde 
followed a semi-presidential model.9 With the displacement of democratic 
governments by authoritarian regimes soon after independence, most inherited 
parliamentary systems were replaced by presidential systems in which 
presidents had extensive governmental authority vested in them. This 
institutional shift from parliamentary to presidential regimes is reflected in the 
regime types as they are currently in place on the continent.  
Today, only seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have a popularly 
elected president. In two of these countries, Swaziland and Lesotho, monarchs 
serve as both head of state and head of government, which means the executive 
has a separate mandate, albeit not from the electorate. Another two countries, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, have parliamentary systems, in the sense that the 
legislative and executive powers originate from the same electoral mandate, but 
given the history of these two countries, their current regime type cannot be 
regarded as part of a British colonial legacy. In other words, only three countries 
on the continent, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, retained the 
parliamentary regimes they inherited as part of their British colonial legacy and 
still show the two characteristics that classify them as parliamentary regimes: 
the executive needs the continued confidence of the legislature to stay in power 
and shares its electoral mandate with the legislature (Lijphart 1992).   
                                                 
9 The former Belgian colonies Rwanda and Burundi were presidential and parliamentary 
respectively at independence. Equatorial Guinea was colonised by Spain and presidential at 
independence; Namibia was last colonised by South Africa and followed a hybrid model. 
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Table 2: Regime Type at Independence in 42 African Countries  
Notes:  
* Stefan and Skatch (1993) classify Cape Verde as presidential. Their explanation states that Cape Verde’s first 
constitution was not promulgated until 1980 and for the first five years after its independence the country 
appears to have functioned as a presidential system. The authors of this paper have classified Cape Verde’s 
constitutional design at independence as hybrid, see Lei de organização política do Estado – LOPE, 1975, 
sections 8 and 13.   
** Stefan and Skatch (1993) classify Lesotho as a monarchy but in 1966 Lesotho in fact adopted a Westminster 
style parliamentary system with a constitutional monarch, similar to the British system. The authors have thus 
classified Lesotho as parliamentary.  
*** Stefan and Skatch (1993) classify Malawi as presidential but at independence in 1964 Malawi adopted a 
Westminster-style parliamentary system with Hastings Banda as the prime minister.  In 1966, Malawi moved to 
a presidential system and Banda became the first President. 
**** South Africa at independence was a self-governing dominion under the British Crown who was represented 
by a Governor-General.  
Source: Adapted from Stepan and Skatch (1993). The cases that did not become independent between 1945 and 
1979 have been coded by the authors. The authors also corrected the classification of Cape Verde, Malawi and 
Lesotho. Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been excluded from this table because of their specific history. 
Where executive and legislative powers are fused rather than separated, it is 
difficult to measure the autonomy of the legislature in terms of formal 
constitutional powers. Legislatures in parliamentary regimes, per definition, 
have the power to censure the executive. Likewise, the calling of new elections, 
per definition, affects both branches of government and is therefore not a power 
that one branch of government has over the other. In so far as one can speak of 
the autonomy of legislatures in parliamentary regimes, it clearly requires 
measures other than those we can develop by analysing constitutional provisions 
about censure and dissolution. Within the context of this paper, we will not be 
Presidential (52%) Hybrid (7%) Parliamentary (41%) 
Angola, 1975  
Benin, 1960 
Burkina Faso, 1960 
Cameroon, 1960 
Comoros, 1975 
Congo, Brazzaville, 1960 
Cote d’Ivoire, 1960 
Djibouti, 1977 
Equatorial Guinea, 1968 
Gabon, 1960 
Guinea, 1958 























Sierra Leone, 1961 
Somalia, 1960 







able to further explore this. Instead, we will focus our attention on regimes with 
separately elected presidents. Given the fact that 85% of current regimes in Sub 
Saharan Africa have a separately elected president, measuring the relative 
powers of these presidents in relation to their parliaments is key to assessing the 
level of autonomy of legislatures on the continent.  
Separation of offices 
There is, however, one institutional measure that might help us to assess levels 
of parliamentary autonomy across both presidential and parliamentary regimes 
in Africa: the separation of offices. While not essential to classify systems as 
either parliamentary or presidential, this element of the separation of powers 
doctrine refers to the extent to which positions in government and parliamentary 
seats overlap. Incompatibility of positions in the executive and the legislature 
indicate that there is a certain distance between the two branches of  
government, whereas systems that allow or require the combination of a 
ministerial position and a seat in parliament, are lacking a similar degree of 
independence between parliament and the executive.  
As indicated in table 3, there is a group of countries where the constitution 
explicitly prohibits the combination of a seat in parliament and a ministerial 
position. The Lusophone countries in our study, Cape Verde and Mozambique, 
as well as the Francophone countries, Mali and Senegal, fall into this group, 
together with Nigeria. In these five countries, a seat in parliament is 
incompatible with a position in cabinet and ministers are compelled to give up 
their seat when they join the cabinet. Our study does not include enough 
francophone and lusophone countries to conclusively detect a pattern but our 
evidence does suggest that incompatibility provisions differ according to 
colonial legacy. The separation of offices creates a certain distance between the 
executive and the legislature that might be typical for those countries formerly 
colonised by France and Portugal and suggests that parliaments in these 
countries have a greater degree of autonomy than their counterparts elsewhere.  
Table 3 also shows that there is a large group of countries where the 
combination of a position in cabinet and a seat in parliament is required. In other 
words, the constitution stipulates that all ministers need to be MPs in order to be 
part of the cabinet. Interestingly, this is the design of choice in the parliamentary 
systems of Botswana and Lesotho but also in most of our countries with elected 
presidents: Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
This element of constitutional design is especially telling about the degree of 
parliamentary autonomy when regarded in combination with provisions for the 
inclusion of special seats in parliament. As table 1 above showed, Botswana, 
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Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe all have a number of special 
parliamentary seats that allow the president to appoint someone from outside 
parliament to a ministerial post and subsequently appoint this person to 
parliament. Namibia, although not having any special parliamentary seats, has a 
constitutional provision making members of the executive who have not been 
elected to parliament ex officio MPs without voting rights, thus allowing the 
president to appoint ministers from outside parliament. In other words, 
theoretically, the requirement that ministers need to be MPs limits the choice of 
the president and restricts his authority in cabinet formation. However, 
provisions for special seats undermine any advantage parliament might have 
gained in this regard. In fact, it seriously undermines the autonomy of the 
legislature when the executive can determine part of its composition simply by 
appointing a portion of its members.   
Table 3: Separation of Offices in 16 African Countries 
All ministers are MPs: 
combination required 
Most ministers are MPs: 
combination allowed 



















Source: Authors’ coding of constitutions. 
The case of Namibia points us to another detrimental effect of the constitutional 
provision dealing with the combination of offices. In small parliaments like the 
Namibian National Assembly with only 72 seats, the requirement that all 
ministers need to be MPs might have the effect that more than half of the 
members of parliament are actually members of the cabinet, thus making it 
extremely difficult for the legislature to flex its muscles vis-à-vis the executive. 
In fact, the Namibian president has increased the number of cabinet positions to 
a point where ministers do make up more than the majority of Namibian MPs. It 
means that cabinet alone can determine the outcome of a vote in the National 
Assembly. In order to get government decisions accepted in parliament, there is 
no need for any backbench involvement, let alone any cross party support. This 
specific set of circumstances explains why the National Assembly in Windhoek 
has been described as a rubberstamp of presidential decisions (Melber 2005). It 
makes the Namibian legislature a parliament without any autonomy.           
Finally, table 3 shows that there is a third category of countries where the 
combination of offices is not constitutionally required but merely allowed: 
Ghana, Malawi and South Africa. In these countries, not all ministers have to be 
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an MP upon appointment, although most ministers happen to be recruited from 
parliament and retain their seat once appointed. In Ghana, section 78.1 of the 
constitution stipulates that the majority of ministers must be appointed from 
amongst the members of parliament, while section 91.3 of the South African 
constitution allows the president to appoint not more than 2 ministers who have 
not been elected as MPs.  
The full implications of these differences in fusion or separation of offices needs 
further study but the pattern described here does suggest important differences 
in the degree of autonomy amongst African legislatures that cut across the 
distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes.  
The relative powers of parliaments and 
presidents 
We now turn our attention to 13 countries that have separately elected 
presidents, in an attempt to further classify and compare parliamentary 
autonomy in these regimes. We have followed a framework developed by 
Shugart and Carey (1992) and coded the relative powers of presidents along two 
dimensions: (1) their powers with regard to appointing and dismissing ministers 
and (2) their powers in the case of censure by and dissolution of the legislature, 
that is, the extent to which the separately elected branches of government 
depend on each other to stay in power.    
Separate survival 
Measuring the powers of elected presidents in terms of censure means that the 
president gets the highest score of 4 if the legislature may not censure and 
remove the cabinet or individual ministers. If the legislature may censure but the 
president may respond by dissolving the legislature, we gave a score of 2. If a 
vote of ‘no confidence’ by the legislature needs to be constructive, in other 
words, if the legislature can only pass a vote of ‘no confidence’ if it 
simultaneously presents an alternative cabinet, the score is 1. If the right to 
censure is unrestricted, the score is 0. Table 4 shows that amongst our 13 
countries, only Ghana and Tanzania have constitutional provisions that indicate 
the legislature has unrestricted power to censure cabinet. On the opposite end of 
the scale, we find Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia where the legislature 
does not have the power to censure and remove ministers. In the remaining 
seven countries, the legislature may censure but he president may respond by 
dissolving parliament which effectively restricts the power to censure and 
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signifies a lower degree of parliamentary autonomy. In none of our countries do 
we find constitutional provisions for a constructive vote of ‘no confidence’. 







Cape Verde 1* 2 2 3 
Ghana 3 4 0 0 
Kenya 4 4 2 2 
Malawi 4 4 4 0 
Mali 4** 2 2 3 
Mozambique 4 4 2 1 
Namibia 4 2 2 2 
Nigeria 3 4 4 0 
Senegal 4** 4 2 3 
Tanzania 1 4 0 1 
Uganda 3 4 4 0 
Zambia 4 4 4 2 
Zimbabwe 4 4 2 4 
Notes: 
*Cape Verde has a constitutional provision that states that the president nominates the premier but only after 
consultation with the parties that are represented in the legislature (section 134). The president subsequently 
appoints the ministers nominated by the premier (section 193).  We have taken the first section as a form of 
investiture and have thus given Cape Verde a score of 1 for cabinet formation. 
**Mali and Senegal have been given a score of 4 signifying extensive powers for the president in terms of 
cabinet formation. They have similar provisions stating that the president names the premier without needing 
confirmation from the legislature and appoints the other ministers after consultation with the premier.  
Source: Authors’ coding of constitutions. 
Shugart and Carey’s (1992) coding scheme also measures the president’s power 
to dissolve the legislature as a separate variable. In this case, the scores range 
from unrestricted power to dissolve to various types of restrictions to no 
constitutional provision for dissolution, that is, from no to full autonomy of the 
legislature. As table 4 indicates, the constitutions of Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and 
Uganda do not include a provision for the power of the president to dissolve 
parliament. In Tanzania and Mozambique, the president can only dissolve 
parliament as a response to censure by the legislature and thus these two 
countries received a score of 1. In Kenya, Namibia and Zambia, the power of the 
president to dissolve parliament is restricted in the sense that the dissolution of 
parliament requires new presidential elections. These countries were given a 
score of 2. In Cape Verde, Mali and Senegal, the constitution also restricts the 
power to dissolve parliament in these cases by frequency or point in term thus 
resulting in a score of 3. Finally the only president in our study with unrestricted 
powers to dissolve parliament is the Zimbabwean president, having received a 
score of 4.  
For the purposes of measuring the extent to which the executive and legislative 
branches of government in our 13 countries depend on each other to stay in 
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power, we have subsequently reversed the codes for the dissolution powers of 
presidents as presented in table 4. This indicates that where the powers of the 
president are strongest, the score is the lowest because the two branches are the 
least separate. Where the powers are non-existent or weak, the score is higher 
signifying more independence between the executive and the legislature in terms 
of survival, that is, more parliamentary autonomy. The horizontal axis in figure 
1 is thus based on a combination of the scores for censure and the reversed 
scores for dissolution.  
 
Figure 1: Cabinet Power and Separate Survival in 13 African Countries 
Source: Authors’ coding of constitutions; typology adapted from Shugart and Carey (1992: 160). 
Shugart and Carey (1992) used the dimension of separate survival to 
differentiate between pure presidential and hybrid systems in which a variety of 
constitutional checks and balances restricts the separation of powers. Our coding 
of constitutions shows that amongst our 13 cases, we have five countries that 
clearly fall into the pure presidential right hand corner of figure 3: Nigeria, 
Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Mozambique. In these countries, strong 
executives do not depend on the legislature to stay in power and do not have 
unrestricted power to dissolve parliament. Hence, we find that parliaments in 
these countries might be weak but, at least on paper, have some degree of 
autonomy: the length of their term does not lie entirely in the hands of the 
president. In the left hand corner of the figure, we find Zimbabwe where 
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parliament can censure and remove cabinet but the president has unrestricted 
power to dissolve parliament, thus signifying a very low degree of parliamentary 
autonomy. In fact, Shugart and Carey (1992) identified countries falling into this 
corner as having a president-parliamentary regime. They assert that this form of 
regime should be avoided because it combines the primacy of the president with 
the dependence of cabinet on parliament and is therefore prone to regimes crises 
and instability (ibid). Senegal, Tanzania and Mali are the countries in our 
analysis that together with Zimbabwe clearly fall into this category. Another 
three countries fall on the boundary between pure presidential and president-
parliamentary systems - Kenya, Ghana and Namibia – and will be further 
discussed below. As will Cape Verde, the only country in our study that can be 
identified as having a premier-presidential regime, the hybrid system Shugart 
and Carey seem to recommend.              
Presidents, premiers and cabinet power 
Measuring the relative powers of elected presidents in terms of cabinet 
formation and dismissal using Shugart and Carey’s (1992) coding scheme is 
relatively straightforward. The power of the president over cabinet can basically 
range from unrestricted to restricted to no power. In other words, if cabinet 
formation depends entirely on the president, the score is 4. If the president 
names ministers but the legislature needs to approve the nominations, the score 
is 3. If the president names the premier and after an investiture vote, the premier 
subsequently names the rest of the cabinet the score is 1. If the president cannot 
name ministers except when recommended by the legislature, the score is 0. A 
similar coding scheme is applicable to cabinet dismissal. If the president has full 
powers to dismiss the cabinet at will, the score is 4. Restricted powers of 
dismissal score 2. If the president may only dismiss when the legislature accepts 
an alternative minister or cabinet, the score is 1. If ministers or the cabinet can 
only be censured and removed by the legislature, the score is 0.  
Looking at the first two columns of table 4 and the vertical axis of figure 1, there 
are a number of interesting findings. The vertical axis of figure 1 shows the 
combined scores for cabinet formation and cabinet dismissal. It shows that in all 
our countries presidents scored 5 or higher when it comes to their cabinet power, 
with Cape Verde being the only exception. Shugart and Carey (1992) used the 
relative power of the president over cabinet composition to differentiate between 
the above mentioned president-parliamentary systems and premier-presidential 
regimes. The figure shows that of the 13 countries in our study, only Cape Verde 
falls into the premier-presidential corner, which means that it is the only country 
in our study in which the president has to share a significant amount of authority 
over cabinet with the premier.  
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Breaking this pattern down into its two composite variables, we find that Cape 
Verde, Mali and Namibia are the only countries in which the president’s power 
to dismiss cabinet members is restricted. In all other countries in our study the 
president can dismiss ministers at will. The picture reveals slightly more 
variation when we turn to the process of cabinet formation. In eight of our 13 
countries, the president has unrestricted powers of cabinet formation. In Ghana, 
Nigeria and Uganda, some form of confirmation by the legislature is needed to 
appoint the cabinet. Cape Verde and Tanzania are the only countries in our study 
in which the legislature plays a strong role in cabinet formation but because the 
Tanzanian president has full powers to dismiss the cabinet, Tanzania still has to 
be placed in the top left hand corner of our figure amongst the president-
parliamentary systems.  
In addition to using Shugart and Carey’s (1992) coding scheme to measure 
separation of survival and the cabinet powers of elected presidents, we set 
ourselves the task of identifying those countries in which executive powers are 
shared between the president and a premier. Of the 13 countries selected here, 
six have constitutional provisions establishing the position of a premier as part 
of the executive. The position of a premier seems useful in further classifying 
the three countries that fall on the boundary between pure presidential and 
president-parliamentary regimes. Of these three, only Namibia has a premier and 
would thus fall into the hybrid part of figure 1, whereas Ghana and Kenya do not 
have the position of premier and are therefore more appropriately classified as 
presidential.  
The existence of a premier, however, does not give us an indication of the 
strength of the parliaments in these systems. Only if the premier has some 
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the president would he or she be able to enhance 
the role of the legislature. We found that in two of the six systems with a 
premier, Cape Verde and Senegal, the constitution explicitly states that the 
premier and not the president presides at cabinet meetings. In Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania, the four other countries where the position 
of premier exist, the president chairs the cabinet and the premier seems to 
mainly function as the Leader of Government Business in Parliament. In other 
words, Cape Verde and Senegal are the only countries where the premier seems 
to give parliament some influence in the executive branch of government. 
However, the president’s full powers over the composition of cabinet undermine 
this influence in Senegal, thus leaving us with Cape Verde as the only case in 
our study where the powers of the president are balanced by the position of a 
premier who takes a leading role in the cabinet and depends on parliamentary 
confidence. 
While our measures of the relative powers of parliaments and presidents suggest 
important variations in regime types and patterns of executive-legislative 
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relations across Africa, they generally confirm the conventional wisdom about 
Africa’s governments: weak parliaments are faced with strong presidents. Our 
exercise in regime classification showed a fair amount of countries falling into 
the hybrid categories but most of these are designed as president-parliamentary 
systems with generally lower levels of parliamentary autonomy than pure 
presidential regimes. Combined with generally low levels of parliamentary 
resources, this means that the institutional capacity of African parliaments to 
hold strong presidents to account is fairly limited. The fact that Cape Verde is 
the only premier-presidential case in our study, and probably on the continent, is 
an indication that the capacity of African parliaments to exert any influence in 
terms of policy-making is equally limited. As mentioned above, we did find 
interesting cross- national variations in the institutional capacity of legislatures 
but need to extend our analysis to all 48 Sub Saharan countries in Africa and 
include more variables related to resources and constitutional powers to gain 
more insight into these differences and their possible explanations (see Mozaffar 
and Nijzink 2006 forthcoming). 
What do Africans think about their 
parliaments? 
We have seen that Africa’s parliaments generally lack the institutional capacity 
to be influential in law-making or oversight, but we have not yet paid any 
attention to the third responsibility typically taken on by parliaments across the 
world: representation. The study by Barkan, in the 1970s, already showed that 
even within the context of a single party regime, the Kenyan legislature played 
an important role in linking citizens to the state. Faced with strong presidents 
across the continent, representation could be the area in which Africa’s current 
parliaments focus most of their attention. However, the little evidence that we 
have suggests the existence of a ‘representation gap’ between MPs and the 
public.  
We have already mentioned the study by Mattes and Chiwandamira (2004) in 
which they present evidence of a gap between Zambian MPs and the citizens 
they represent. This study is vital not just because it presents findings on the 
issue of representation in one of the countries in our study but also because it 
points us to the importance of public opinion for assessing the relationship 
between parliaments and the public. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi have 
extensively described public opinion in Africa in their recent volume (Bratton et 
al. 2005). On the basis of surveys in 12 African countries between 1999 and 
2001 they have identified a representation gap, in the form of a dearth of formal 
contacts between the electorate and their public representatives. Based on self-
reporting of the frequency of contact respondents have had with their MPs, 
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Bratton et al. find that an average of 6 percent of all respondents said they have 
ever interacted with a national MP, with reported contact rates ranging from 0.2 
percent in South Africa and 16 percent in Uganda. In general, African MPs do 
seem to have trouble reaching the citizens they represent. Interestingly, this does 
not seem to be related to the physical size of the country or the difficulties of 
travel in certain areas. And also their electoral systems - whether constituency 
based or not - do not explain why some countries have higher reported contact 
rates than others. We obviously need further study, preferably matching public 
opinion with MP’s opinions and behavioural measures, to get to the bottom of 
this representation gap in Africa and how detrimental it is for the quality of 
democracy on the continent.   
The public opinion surveys that are available to us via the Afrobarometer10 do 
not only indicate the existence of a representation gap but also reveal a number 
of patterns in people’s perceptions of their elected representatives that could 
have more positive consequences for the quality of democracy on the continent. 
Below we report some patterns in people’s perceptions of parliaments from 
Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 15 countries between June 2002 and 
November 2003. It covers the countries included in our study so far, with the 
exception of Zimbabwe.  



































































% disapprove/strongly disapprove of authoritarian alternative
 
Figure 2: Rejection of Authoritarian Alternative, 2003 
Note: The Afrobarometer surveys asked the following question: ‘There are many ways to govern a country. 
Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?’ Figure 2 indicates the percentage of 
respondents in each country that disapproved or strongly disapproved of the statement: ‘Elections and the 
National Assembly are abolished so that the President can decide everything.’  
Source: Afrobarometer (2004).  
                                                 
10 See www.afrobarometer.org. 
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First, the Afrobarometer surveys show widespread support amongst Africans for 
the institutions of representative democracy, in the form of a firm rejection of 
authoritharian alternatives. In all countries, except Mozambique, overwhelming 
majorities of citizens disapprove of a situation in which ‘elections and the 
National Assembly are abolished so that the President can decide everything’. In 
Mozambique, 41 percent of respondents rejected the authoritarian alternative. In 
the other countries, the percentage ranged from 90 in Kenya, Uganda and 
Zambia to 66 in Mali and 58 in Namibia. (see figure 2) Despite these cross-
national differences, Africans generally prefer democratic legislatures over 
































































The National Assemby should make law s; even if the President does not agree
The President should pass law s w ithout w orring about the National Assembly
Do not agree w ith either
 
Figure 3: Perceptions of Executive-Legislative Relations, 2003   
Note: The Afrobarometer surveys asked the following question: ‘Which of the following statements is closest to 
your own view, A or B? A. The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should 
make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree. B. Since the President represents all of us, he 
should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.’ Figure 3 indicates the percentage 
of respondents in each country that agreed or strongly agreed with each statement.  
Source: Afrobarometer (2004).  
Second, Africans support the independence of parliament in relation to the 
president. In 11 countries, overwhelming majorities of the population think that 
‘parliament should make laws even if the president does not agree’. Only in 
Cape Verde, Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia does the percentage of 
citizens agreeing to this statement fall below 50. However, even in Namibia, 
which has the lowest percentage of people agreeing with an independent role for 
the legislature (36 percent), support for the president does not rise above 50 
percent. In fact, the percentage of Namibians agreeing that ‘since the president 
represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about the National 
Assembly’ is 45. This seems to indicate that Namibians are well aware of the 
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weakness of their National Assembly and the near absolute control of the 
President we discussed earlier in this paper. More generally, these findings 
suggest that citizens prefer their parliaments to have a certain degree of 

































































% approve/strongly approve of President's performance
% approve/strongly approve of MP's performance 
 
Figure 4: Performance Evaluations of President and MP, 2003 
Note: The Afrobarometer surveys asked the following question: ’Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 
twelve months, or haven't heard enough about them to say?: The President, the Representative 
to Parliament or the National Assembly. 
Figure 4 indicates the percentage of respondents in each country that approved or strongly 
approved of the performance of the President and MP, respectively.  
Source: Afrobarometer (2004).  
Third, the Afrobarometer surveys allow us to compare citizens’ evaluations of 
the way the president and the representative to parliament have performed their 
job. In the absence of concepts and measures to comparatively assess legislative 
performance, this data gives us at least some idea of how well or badly MPs do 
their job. On average, Africans rate the performance of the president higher than 
that of parliamentarians: 70 percent of citizens approved of their president’s 
performance and 52 percent approved of the performance of their MP. The most 
highly rated presidents were Mwai Kibaki of Kenya (as measured in September 
2003, nine months after his election), Sam Nujoma of Namibia (in August 
2003), and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania (in July 2003). Despite the presidents 
receiving better job approval ratings than the MPs, the latter are still judged 
positively. In nine countries, 50 percent or more of the respondents approved of 
the performance of their MPs. The countries where this percentage dropped 
below 50 percent are South Africa and Senegal, where 45 percent of people 
approved of the MPs performance, and Malawi, Cape Verde, Zambia and 
Nigeria with levels between 41 percent and 32 percent, respectively. 
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Interestingly, the Zambian president’s rating was more than twice as high as the 
approval rating of Zambian MPs, whereas Cape Verdians give their president 
and MPs similar ratings. Cape Verde is, in fact, the only country where citizens 
rate their MPs slightly higher than their president, which seems to confirm Cape 
Verde’s position as an exceptional case in our analysis.    
These patterns in public opinion indicate that, overall, citizens in Africa are not 
greatly dissatisfied with their elected representatives but there is room for 
improvement. They seem to have a preference for parliaments that are assertive 
in relation to the executive, which in most cases would mean parliaments that 
are stronger than our previous analysis indicates. This is a reason for optimism. 
Although the representation gap is real and needs addressing, especially if 
parliaments are to play a role as agents of democratic change, citizens do seem 
to support parliaments asserting themselves vis-a-vis strong presidents.  Whether 
parliaments can in fact assert themselves and enhance the quality of democracy 
on the African continent brings us back to the question of institutional capacity 
we discussed earlier in this paper. 
Can parliaments enhance the quality of 
democracy on the African continent? 
A first step in addressing this question is to see whether the types of regime as 
we have recorded them are in any way related to the current levels of democracy 
on the continent. 
Table 5: Current Regime Type in 16 African Countries  


















Note: According to our coding, Namibia, Ghana and Kenya were on the boundary between presidential and 
hybrid. Here, we have classified Namibia as hybrid because it has a premier; Ghana and Kenya do not have a 
premier, so they fall into the presidential category in this table. This means that Zimbabwe is the only hybrid 
system without a premier. 
Source: Authors’ coding of constitutions. 
Our findings on the current levels of democracy on the African continent are in 
line with the recent literature about the classification of political regimes in 
Africa (Diamond  2002) and point to a great deal of variation on the continent. 
Based on scores for political rights and civil liberties that the U.S. based NGO 
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Freedom House regularly gives to all countries in the world, table 6 shows there 
are a number of liberal democracies in Africa today. In our study, Cape Verde, 
South Africa, Botswana, Ghana and Mali fall into this category. Second, there 
are a number of ‘electoral democracies’, that is countries with regular, 
competitive multiparty elections but where civil and political freedoms 
necessary for political debate and election campaigning are curtailed. Namibia, 
Senegal and Lesotho fall into this category. Third is a group of ambiguous 
regimes in which the form but not the substance of electoral democracy exist 
and scores on civil and political liberties are generally lower. Most of the 
countries in our study fall into this hybrid category: Kenya, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. They fall ‘on the blurry boundary 
between electoral democracy and competitive authoritarianism’ and might move 
more either towards democracy or autocracy in the near future. Finally, there are 
countries that cannot be classified other than autocratic because they do not 
respect important political and civil liberties and, although they might hold 
regular and even multi-party elections, fail to meet more substantive standards 
of democracy. In our study, Uganda and Zimbabwe fall into this category. 
 


























Note: Country scores are the 2004 scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively. Authors have 
reversed the original scores so 1 represents the least democratic and 7 the most democratic rating.  
*including hegemonic electoral autocracies (Uganda) and competitive authoritarian regimes (Zimbabwe) 
Source: Freedom in the World website, www.freedomhouse.org; Regime types are adapted from Diamond 
(2002). 
The differences in the quality of democracy that are apparent in this 
classification of current political regimes in Africa are measures of the broader 
political context in which African parliaments operate. They also present us with 
a measurement of the outcome many international donors would like to 
influence. Exploring whether this outcome is in any way related to the regime 
types as we recorded them for the 16 countries in our analysis leads to a few 
interesting findings. Without taking the possible influence of third variables into 
account, a simple cross tabulation of the two relevant variables (see table 7) 
shows that, with the exception of Ghana, pure presidential regimes tend to fall 
into the categories with lower levels of democracy, whereas parliamentary 
regimes show higher democracy levels. More importantly, hybrid regimes do 
not seem to be clearly related to a specific level of democracy. Cape Verde with 
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its premier-presidential system shows in fact the highest levels of democracy but 
the remaining five hybrid cases do not seem to be clustered around a specific 
level of democracy or a specific political regime.  
Table 7: Quality of Democracy by Regime Type 
Regime Type   


















































This finding suggests three directions for further study. First, we need to extend 
our measurements of the relative powers of presidents and parliaments to all 48 
Sub Saharan countries while including more variables related to resources in 
order to gain more insight into the institutional capacity of parliaments in 
various regimes. Second, we need to know more about the way in which the 
details of institutional designs affect the balance of power between the executive 
and the legislature if we want to gain more insight into parliamentary autonomy 
and its effect on the quality of democracy. Third, we need to develop measures 
of parliamentary performance and take variables related to the social, economic 
and political context into account to conduct a full analysis of the effect of 
regime types on the quality of democracy and more conclusively answer the 
question whether parliaments can enhance the quality of democracy on the 
African continent.  
The study we mentioned earlier by Barkan et al. (2004) shows that, given the 
right conditions, small coalitions of progressive legislators can achieve critical 
mass and become influential advocates for institutional reform and democratic 
change. A further study of the institutional capacity of parliaments will identify 
the constitutional obstacles such coalitions need to overcome in order to be 
successful. Together with measures of parliamentary performance, it would 
greatly enhance our knowledge about parliaments in Africa. It would benefit 
international donors in that it would help them to target their funds where they 
can have the most impact on the quality of democracy on the continent.   
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